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ABSTRACT

Despite procedural modifications and advanced technology instrumentation, instrument approach
phase accidents continue to be an issue in general aviation. This exploratory study details an
analysis of instrument approach phase accidents that occurred between 2002 and 2012.
Particular attention was focused on Instrument Proficiency Check (IPC) currency for pilots
involved in accidents during the approach phase of flight. An analysis suggests that more than
half of instrument approach accidents evaluated during this study happened within three and half
months of the last IPC. A leading cause of these accidents was failure to control the aircraft.
Instrument training issues and potential follow-on studies are addressed
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On Sept 8, 2010, around 0926 EDT, an aircraft on instrument approach to Helena,
Georgia, crashed killing the instrument rated pilot and seriously injuring his passenger. Radar
data indicated that after the aircraft was established on a GPS final approach course the pilot did
not appear to level off at the MDA and impacted the ground 2.74 miles from the runway.
Weather in the area at the time was reported as foggy with low ceilings and visibility. During
the ten-year period ending in August 2012, this was just one of 170 IFR approach-related
accidents, highlighting the need for further investigation into trends and causes (ASI, 2012).
Introduction
In response to the wide variety of weather conditions and areas of concentrated air traffic,
pilots with a commercial pilot certificate usually operate in an environment dictated by
instrument flight rules. Such operations are monitored by an extensive air traffic control network
that depends primarily on ground based radar, aural, and data link communications. Despite
such oversight, safe flight progress is still the responsibility of certified commercial pilots who
have been evaluated as proficient in all aspects of aircraft operation. This is particularly true
during the descent and approach phases of flight conducted in actual instrument conditions,
where weather obscures ground features and the skill level of pilot in command is critical to the
safe conclusion of the flight. Over the last two decades, evolving technology and changes in
flight procedures seem key to a dramatic reduction in aviation accidents, particularly in the
approach phase (FAA, 2010). However, approach phase accidents continue in be a concern and
further research is needed to address causes and remediation. The current exploratory study was
conducted to better understand factors related to instrument approach accidents and the
proficiency levels of instrument rated general aviation pilots.

FLIGHT SKILL PROFICIENCY ISSUES IN INSTRUMENT APPROACH ACCIDENTS

4

Instrument Flight Qualification
Federal Aviation Regulations direct that, after initial qualification, instrument rated
pilots must complete holding procedures, six instrument approaches, and course interception and
tracking within every six calendar months (FAA, 2012a). If the six month period after formal
certification expires without recurrent training in instrument procedures, the pilot must complete
an instrument proficiency check (IPC) to be recertified (unless currency is attained within the six
month period following the initial certification period). Although airline pilots and those who fly
for part 135 operators perform frequent instrument maneuvers and procedures during the course
of monthly operations, many instrument rated general aviation pilots may go an extended time
period flying infrequently and usually in a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) environment. As a result,
when such pilots do operate using Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) procedures, especially in actual
weather conditions, they are not well prepared procedurally or able to fly the close operational
tolerances mandated in an instrument approach phase. In addition, pilots who routinely fly
instrument approaches depending on advanced instrumentation and autopilot systems may
experience a deteriorated ability to manually control an aircraft when encountering actual IFR
conditions.
Fanjoy and Young (2005) conducted a study of 100 airline pilots using a Level C flight
simulator and found that experienced airline pilots who routinely fly automated instrument
procedures had great difficulty maintaining acceptable airspeed, heading, and altitude tolerances
when manually controlling an aircraft on final approach. In addition, over half of the study
participants reported a degradation of their manual flight skills due to the regular use of
automated approach systems. Although this degradation could have been mitigated by periodic
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“hands-on” practice, such practice may not be practical due to company policies or infrequency
of flight operations by a given pilot.
Flight Skill Degradation
Few empirical investigations specifically address flight skill degradation of pilots.
Mengelkoch, Adams, and Gainer (1971) studied 33 non-pilot students, assigned to two groups, to
determine skill degradation after academic instruction and training in a mock-up aircraft cockpit.
One group completed five evaluated training sessions in a flight simulator while the second
group completed ten evaluated training sessions. Both groups were evaluated again after four
months. The group with 10 training sessions performed better than the five training session
group on this final evaluation. However, findings suggest both groups experienced skill
degradation and in particular there seemed to be a greater loss of procedural knowledge than loss
of flight control motor skills. Of the flight motor skills, altitude and airspeed control seemed to
show significant degradation for both groups over the training interval.
Research by Childs, Spears and Prophet (1983) supports significant psychomotor and
cognitive skill degradation over time if practice and reinforcement are irregular. Skill
degradation can be attributed to either forgetting or confusing tasks that are required for safe
flight. The results of this study suggested that perceptual and cognitive cues decay rapidly while
motor skills are retained significantly longer. Hendricks, Goldsmith and Johnson (2006) studied
flight performance data collected from airline pilots. One group was evaluated six months after
training and a second group was evaluated after 12 months. Significant skill decay was found
for the group evaluated 12 months after training compared to those who were evaluated after six
months. This skill degradation was noted for both frequently practiced maneuvers and less
frequently practiced maneuvers (emergency procedures).
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An empirical study by Ebbatson, Harris, Huddlestone and Sears (2010) investigated the
relationship between manual flying performance and recent flight experience of airline pilots.
Study pilots who flew more in the previous week showed less frequent pitch and yaw inputs
during approach maneuvers. This suggests that pilots who have recent flight experience fly more
smoothly. The longer the period of time between manually flown approaches the poorer the
performance.
Gillen (2010) evaluated the basic instrument flight skills of 30 certified Airline
Transportation Pilots (ATP) and found them to be significantly below Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) standards. The evaluation took place in a level D simulator under the
conditions of failed automation. Researchers also noted that the participant pilots perceived
themselves proficient in handling the aircraft under conditions of failed automation when
questioned in a pre-test survey. Study findings suggest that the participants were overconfident
and not proficient in instrument flight skills.
In a study by Sohn and Doane (2004), 52 pilots were asked to complete three tasks that
measured memory, recall, and situational tasks. Their findings indicate memory plays a
significant role in situational awareness. While a novice pilot’s working memory can be
overloaded, experienced pilots use stored information which assists in decreasing their workload.
These findings are consistent with previous studies that suggest cognitive abilities are more
important for skill retention during initial training than practiced skills.
Causse, Dehais, and Pastor (2011) conducted an experiment to predict flight simulator
performance based on personality traits. Twenty-four pilots were evaluated with
neuropsychological tests to determine their tendencies in low level executive functions of
reasoning, inhibition and updating. Once these executive functions were evaluated, the subjects’
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decision making under conditions of adverse weather were tested in a flight simulator. Findings
suggested linkage between executive function tendencies and aeronautical decision making. For
example, the executive function of updating was correlated with flight performance. Flying is a
dynamic experience which requires memory functions to process and update information to
maintain situational awareness. Another finding, focused on inhibition, was that subjects who
were assessed as impulsive tended to inappropriately continue a landing in dangerous
crosswinds. The researchers recommended that executive functions should be evaluated during
annual medical examinations to identify potential flight safety concerns.
O’Hare (2006) conducted a study to identify the perceptions of pilots who had accidents
or incidents during flight operations. A questionnaire was sent to every licensed pilot with a
current medical certificate in New Zealand. Over 1,000 respondents acknowledged they had
been in an accident or incident and answered further questions. The questions pertained to
factors that initiated the event, what hindered action to prevent the event, and the extent of pilot
involvement in the evolving hazardous situation. The main finding of the study was that
accidents reflected more cognitive disconnect of knowledge and strategy than incidents. In
addition, incidents were caused primarily by events outside the pilot’s control.
Shorrock (2005) interviewed 28 experienced air traffic controllers in London, UK. The
point of the study was to gain insight on how controller memory lapses can lead to an operational
incident. The second part of the study included an analysis of incident reports. Results lead
researchers to suggest errors could be attributed to lack of attention, fixation on other duties, lack
of practice, and work overload.
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Skill Retention Theory
Fitts and Posner (1967) proposed learning, skill, and retention happen in three sequential
stages: cognitive, associative and autonomous. Cognitive learning degrades with lack of use,
sometimes to the point of total memory loss of the skill. When associative learning degrades,
errors occur. In the autonomous stage, a learner can still complete the task if the information is
internalized and not lost over time.
Researchers suggest that closed looped task knowledge will decay at a greater rate than
open looped tasks (Farr, 1987). An example of an open looped task is controlling an aircraft in
straight and level flight with the airplane trimmed for minimal pilot input. An example of a
closed loop task is flying an instrument approach. That procedure requires constant feedback
from the instruments to be performed precisely and safely.
Muller and Pilzecker developed the memory consolidation theory 112 years ago. During
that time, while testing human subjects, they discovered that recall of learned information might
be interrupted by the learning of other information right after the original learning. Their findings
indicated new memories initially persevere in a delicate state and consolidate over time.
Memory consolidation hypotheses are still used to guide researchers studying the time-dependent
interaction and brain processes (McGaugh, 2000). During initial and recurrent instrument flight
training, several distinct blocks of knowledge are mastered. In consideration of memory
consolidation theory, mastery of initial or previously learned information can be interrupted.
Practicing or revisiting a learned skill can reduce skill degradation. This spacing effect
describes how the longer a person waits to recall information, the more likely information will be
forgotten (Cepeda, Pasheler, Vul, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2006). Optimal spacing of recurrent
training depends on how long the information needs to be retained. Research suggests that 10 to
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20 percent of a retention interval is an ideal time period for recurrent training (Rohrer & Pashler,
2007). This theory and related research have provided organizations and regulatory agencies
with guidelines for appropriate retraining intervals.
Contemporary theories suggest motor skill proficiency is related to practicing an action.
Improved motor skill performance can happen over time if the practiced skill repeatedly meets
the demands of a given task. The relationship between physical movement and the outcome of
action are should be the focus for increasing levels of proficiency (Newell, 1991). Motor skill
learning is an active process, interrelated with cognition (Gallahue & Cleland, 2003). As a pilot
gains more flight experience, his/her motor skills and cognitive functions are likely to improve.
Causes of Accidents in IFR Conditions
An FAA study (2012) evaluated 26 interviews from pilots who declared an emergency,
requested assistance, or made a deviation while facing adverse weather conditions. Researchers
also analyzed weather conditions at the incident in question. Their findings indicated
deficiencies in pilot education and training when tasked with deciphering weather information.
The study recommended all pilots receive a designated number of weather training sessions from
a Certified Flight Instructor (CFI). Researchers felt that a home study course would not provide
valid training if used for that purpose.
Wiegmann et al. (2005) conducted an analysis of aircraft accidents using the Human
Factors Accident Classification System (HFACS). That analysis focused on human error in
general aviation accidents. The researchers categorized errors as decision, skill-based, and
perceptual. Errors that led to the largest segment of accidents they investigated were skill-based,
followed by decision and perception errors. Researchers recommended more use of aircraft
automation, improved checklists, and workload management training to mitigate the likelihood
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and nature of future accidents. It was noted that problems with cost, feasibility, and acceptance
are potential roadblocks to implementation of accident mitigation elements.
An FAA study (2010) further supported the categorization of weather related accidents as
resulting from perceptual, skill-based, and decision errors. Skill-based errors are the hardest to
understand because pilots who did not survive cannot report on what happened and pilots who
live often misrepresent their own abilities. In addition, pilots have a tendency to alter the facts
associated with an accident if they feel their testimony may cause repercussion or punishment by
authorities. FAA researchers also found that instrument rated pilots were often prone to getting
into weather conditions that were beyond their limit. A tendency to be overconfident in that
regard was prevalent. Study findings suggest there is a common tendency in the decision making
process to elect to fly into adverse weather instead of diverting around it.
The United States has over 300,000 general aviation aircraft making it the largest general
aviation fleet in the world. Approximately 80% of general aviation accidents are caused by
human error (Wiegman & Shappell, 2001). Over the past 10 years, 170 accidents have occurred
during instrument approaches (FAA, 2012). The purpose of the current study is to examine
general aviation accidents during instrument approach and identify common themes as well as
any correlation between such accidents and the interval after initial or recurring IPC.
Methodology
This study evaluated general aviation accident data from the AOPA Air Safety Institute
(ASI) database. This dataA filtered search was performed to investigate all fixed wing aircraft
accidents over the past ten years that occurred during Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) approaches.
The resulting database filter identified 170 accident reports for analysis. This data was further
sorted to identify 31 accident reports with recorded IPC dates. Those accident reports were
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analyzed to identify correlations and common themes. Data collected from individual accident
reports included: NTSB report number, year of accident, primary cause, engine type, type of
approach flown, total time of pilot flying, pilot flight time in accident aircraft, date pilot was IFR
rated, date of last reported evaluation (IPC), aircraft type, weather condition, and type of
instrument display. Researchers only used information from the official reports and did not
attempt to make personal conclusions on primary or secondary causes of the accident.
Findings
A filtered search of the ASI database resulted in data from 170 general aviation aircraft
accidents over the last ten years. Seven incomplete data sets were removed from the ensuing
analysis. The next step in the analysis was to extract primary accident causes from the ASI
database. For the 163 accidents considered, the primary causes were: failure to control (29.4)%,
Failure to follow instrument approach procedures (29.4%), flight below published minimum
(16.6%), inadequate airspeed (11.7%), spatial disorientation (8%), controlled flight into terrain or
water (2.5%), failure to initiate missed (2.5)% and other causes (3.1%). These percentages are
graphically shown in Figure 1. In some accident reports, secondary causes were identified but
not considered as part of the current study.
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Figure 1. Primary Causes of Instrument Approach Accidents.
Primary Causes of Instrument Approach Accidents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Failure to Control
Failure to Follow Instrument Approach Procedures
Flight Below Published Minimums
Inadequate Airspeed
Spatial Disorientation
Controlled Flight Into Terrain/Water
Failure to Initiate Missed
Other

The study dataset was further filtered to identify accidents with a listed IPC date to
investigate potential correlations between accident causes and time since last IPC. Although
limiting data to those accident pilots without a listed IPC date may affect generalization of study
results, researchers felt this data was still useful in providing insight for follow on studies. For
the current analysis, 31 accidents were identified with listed IPC dates. Primary accident causes
associated with these accidents included: failure to control (29.0%), flight below published
minimums (25.8%), inadequate airspeed (22.6%). failure to follow instrument approach
procedures (9.7%), spatial disorientation (6.5%), failure to initiate missed approach (3.2%) and
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other causes (3.2%). See figure 2 for the primary causes of the accident subset with a listed IPC
date.

Primary Causes of Instrument Approach Accidents with Noted IPC Date
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Figure 2. Primary Causes of Instrument Approach Accidents with Noted IPC Date.
Primary Causes with noted IPC
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Failure to control
Flight Below Published Minimums
Inadequate Airspeed
Failure to Follow Instrument Approach Procedures
Spatial Disorientation
Failure to Initiate Missed Approach
Other

Next, a graphical summary was created to better understand when accidents typically
occur after the IPC. The data shows that most of the accidents in the targeted subset occur
within three and half months of IPC. After this time period, the number of accidents begins to
decrease. The lower quartile of the chart, which represents the 25th percentile, is 50 days. The
upper quartile or the 75th percentile is 156 days. Relative frequency is shown by the height of the
bars. Skewness is > 0 which indicates a positive skewed distribution and accidents were less
likely to happen later in the period after an IPC (See figure 3).
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Figure 3. Summary of days elapsed between instrument proficiency check and accident
Finally, researchers separated primary causes of instrument approach accidents (with IPC
noted) into intervals of time after the last noted IPC. These intervals were 0-100, 101-200, 201300 and 301-500 days. The researcher extended the last interval to 301-500 days because of the
lengthy time period over which the remaining few accidents occurred. Table 1 depicts the
primary causes of accidents during those blocks of time. Thirty-six percent of the accidents that
occurred between 0-100 days after IPC listed flight below published minimums as the primary
cause. Other primary causes during this same block of time included: inadequate airspeed
(29%), failure to control (21%), failure to initiate missed approach (7%) and spatial
disorientation (7%).
Regarding the time interval 101-200 days after IPC, 38% of accidents were caused by
failure to maintain control. Other causes in that interval were: flight below published minimums
(23%), failure to follow instrument approach procedures (23%), spatial disorientation (8%), and
improper decision to abort a landing (8%).
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In the time interval 201-300 days after IPC, one of the accidents was caused by failure to
control and the other by inadequate airspeed. In the 301-500 day time interval, both accidents
were caused by inadequate airspeed. It should be noted that 29 of the 31 accidents used in this
sample were conducted in instrument meteorological conditions. This means there was not an
external reference to the horizon which provides pilots with a natural attitude indication.
Primary Causes of Accidents after IPC in Time Intervals
0-100
Days
(14 Accidents)

101-200
Days
(13 Accidents)

201-300
Days
(2 Accidents)

301-500
Days
(2 Accidents)

Flight Below Published
Minimums
36% (5)

Failure to Maintain Control
38% (5)

Failure to
Maintain Control
50% (1)

Inadequate
Airspeed
100% (2)

Inadequate Airspeed
29% (4)

Flight Below Published
Minimums
23% (3)
Failure to Follow Instrument
Approach Procedures
23% (3)

Inadequate
Airspeed
50% (1)
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Failure to Maintain
Control
21% (3)
Improper Decision to Abort
Failure to Initiate
Landing
Missed
8% (1)
7% (1)
Spatial Disorientation
Spatial Disorientation
8% (1)
7% (1)
Table 1. Primary Causes of accidents after IPC in time intervals.
Discussion and Conclusions

Conventional wisdom within the aviation community is that pilots who have not
demonstrated proficiency in instrument flight procedures for more than six months are unsafe in
instrument flight operations. Previous research into skill degradation suggests that without
regular performance of complex tasks, procedural and motor skills degrade over a fairly short
time frame and procedural knowledge tends to decay more quickly than motor skills. Current
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FAA regulations reflect such findings by mandating training if more than six months have
expired without instrument flight since the last IPC. The current regulations do not mandate what
training is required for IPC’s. However, there is a recommendation of one and half hours of
ground instruction and a two-hour flight.
The results of the current research suggest that more than half of the instrument approach
accidents in the target data set were caused by failure to control the aircraft or failure to follow
procedures. In addition, the number of individuals in the subject data set who had accidents after
an IPC seems to peak at 111 days after being signed off. Any generalization of these findings is
not possible as the pilots of many accident aircraft in the original 170 accident data set may have
had an IPC which was not reported in the accident findings. In addition, data addressing the
recency or number of instrument procedures completed by accident pilots was not available in
many of the reports.
Accidents in the data set with listed IPC dates occurred over a wide time interval.
Literature seems to suggest that primary accident causes would reflect procedural shortcomings
or motor skill deficiencies. In the current study, accidents which reflect procedural shortcomings
(failure to follow procedures, flight below minimums, failure to initiate missed approach,
improper abort decision) seem to increase over the first 200 days following IPC. That finding
would agree with earlier research. The rate of accident causes that reflect motor skill aspects
(failure to control, inadequate airspeed, and spatial disorientation) seems to remain fairly
constant over the 200 day period after IPC. That finding would be consistent with limited ‘stick
and rudder’ practice.
It is important to note the exploratory nature of this study and the relatively small data set
considered. In addition, missing aspects of the original dataset relating to IPC dates and actual
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instrument currency limit the utility of these findings. However, findings do suggest interesting
follow on studies with a larger and more detailed dataset to pin down degradation aspects of
instrument flight proficiency. Findings from such studies should offer insight and opportunities
for mitigation strategies to improve aircraft operations in an instrument environment, particularly
for the general aviation pilot population.
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